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Abstract
Background: Ensuring equity between forcibly-displaced and host area populations is a key challenge for global
elimination programmes. We studied Uganda’s response to the recent refugee influx from South Sudan to identify
key governance and operational lessons for national sleeping sickness programmes working with displaced populations
today. A refugee policy which favours integration of primary healthcare services for refugee and host populations and the
availability of rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) to detect sleeping sickness at this health system level makes Uganda well-placed
to include refugees in sleeping sickness surveillance.
Methods: Using ethnographic observations of coordination meetings, review of programme data, interviews with sleeping
sickness and refugee authorities and group discussions with health staff and refugees (2013–2016), we nevertheless
identified some key challenges to equitably integrating refugees into government sleeping sickness surveillance.
Results: Despite fears that refugees were at risk of disease and posed a threat to elimination, six months into the response,
programme coordinators progressed to a sentinel surveillance strategy in districts hosting the highest concentrations of
refugees. This meant that RDTs, the programme’s primary surveillance tool, were removed from most refugee-serving
facilities, exacerbating existing inequitable access to surveillance and leading refugees to claim that their access to sleeping
sickness tests had been better in South Sudan. This was not intentionally done to exclude refugees from care, rather, four
key governance challenges made it difficult for the programme to recognise and correct inequities affecting refugees: (a)
perceived donor pressure to reduce the sleeping sickness programme’s scope without clear international elimination
guidance on surveillance quality; (b) a problematic history of programme relations with refugee-hosting districts which
strained supervision of surveillance quality; (c) difficulties that government health workers faced to produce good quality
surveillance in a crisis; and (d) reluctant engagement between the sleeping sickness programme and humanitarian
structures.
Conclusions: Despite progressive policy intentions, several entrenched governance norms and practices worked against
integration of refugees into the national sleeping sickness surveillance system. Elimination programmes which marginalise
forced migrants risk unwittingly contributing to disease spread and reinforce social inequities, so new norms urgently need
to be established at local, national and international levels.
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Background
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) encourage
states not to ‘leave behind’ populations who have been for-
cibly displaced by war and other extreme hardships in de-
velopment work. Such forced migrants include people
who are internally displaced to areas within their own
country where different languages, ethnic groups and cus-
toms may predominate, as well as refugees who have left
their country and are seeking protection from another.
Finding effective ways to include forcibly-displaced
populations in global elimination programmes is import-
ant as conflict-affected regions are often the places
where disease is most intractable [1–4]. It is particularly
important for elimination of sleeping sickness (a fatal
parasitic infection also known as human African tryp-
anosomiasis or HAT) as outbreaks in the past have been
associated with forced migrations [5–8]. Populations mi-
grating to avoid conflict or returning after displacement
are particularly vulnerable to sleeping sickness through:
exposure to tsetse flies, which carry the disease, when
settling rural uninhabitated areas; famine and stress
which may make infected carriers more likely to develop
disease and transmit infection; as well as difficulty
accessing health services to detect and treat the disease
[5, 9, 10]. Syndromic-based detection of sleeping sick-
ness during routine care visits, which requires health
staff to recognise symptoms variably affecting the mind
and several body systems and producing different mean-
ings in biomedical and customary health systems, may
be particularly difficult in a cross-cultural context [5, 11].
Humanitarian agencies such as Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF) who have been key providers of sleeping sickness
services for conflict-affected populations in the past are
disengaging from control as disease prevalence declines. It
thus increasingly falls to national programmes and part-
nerships to secure displaced peoples’ inclusion in elimin-
ation activities. Here, we report on governance challenges
experienced by Uganda’s sleeping sickness elimination
programme to include South Sudanese refugees in facility-
based medical surveillance.
Two recent promising, but relatively unstudied, global
policy trends provide favourable conditions for ensuring
refugees’ access to sleeping sickness surveillance in na-
tional elimination programmes: the development of
rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) for use in frontline facil-
ities and the adoption of refugee policies which integrate
health services for refugees in national systems.
With sleeping sickness infection recognised as both an
outcome and driver of poverty, programme outcomes
for this and other ‘neglected tropical diseases’ (NTDs)
have been proposed as tracer indicators for a number of
other SDG targets to monitor social equity [12]. Simi-
larly, global NTD plans stress the need to make disease
control services universally accessible at the primary
healthcare level [13]. For sleeping sickness, this has be-
come more realistic within the last few years with the
development of RDTs which, unlike previous diagnos-
tics, do not require electricity, refrigeration or specia-
lised technical expertise to administer, although further
parasitological confirmation is still required before treat-
ment can be given. Because RDTs can be integrated into
the routine activities of primary healthcare facilities, the
need for external actors to support expensive, independ-
ent mobile teams who screen at-risk populations
systematically is theoretically less important. This new
technology therefore enables a shift in sleeping sickness
control governance away from a largely vertical ap-
proach, often with multiple actors working in parallel on
short-term objectives, towards a long-term, coordinated
approach appropriate for elimination that is integrated
into public health systems and strengthens them [5, 14].
The use of RDTs to secure access to sleeping sickness
services for forced migrants, however, may involve add-
itional social and governance-related considerations
given that forced migrants typically face numerous con-
straints to health, including the embodiment of social
stresses related to their experience of exclusion or mar-
ginalisation [15–17]. Refugee health and agency is par-
ticularly influenced by the policies of humanitarian and
receiving country government systems.
The idea that refugees should be integrated into national
development projects has been proposed as a policy solu-
tion to the negative effects of social marginalisation on
refugee health since the 1980s [18]. Governmental, hu-
manitarian and development actors should arguably share
responsibility for displacement because promoting long-
term refugee well-being and independence from aid is also
good for the host community. Host communities typically
face the same regional development challenges as refu-
gees, such as inadequate healthcare. Addressing refugee
needs sustainably can therefore benefit everyone “like a
rising tide lifts all boats” [19]. While ‘interim integration’
of some services such as for healthcare is increasingly
popular [20], most African states typically oppose compre-
hensive social integration which uniformly grants refugees
the same rights as host nationals, including to claim
citizenship or permanent residence [18]. Within the field
of public health, there has been remarkably little reflection
on the implications of different refugee healthcare
governance models on long term goals such as disease
elimination [20].
The current humanitarian crisis in South Sudan has
caused the displacement of more than 3.7 million
people, including 1 million refugees to Uganda since
December 2013 [21], particularly to the north-western
West Nile Region where the Ugandan government is
operating a programme to eliminate sleeping sickness.
This area was the first in Africa to integrate sleeping
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sickness RDTs into primary healthcare facilities on a
large scale. Uganda has also pioneered a refugee pol-
icy which favours integration of primary healthcare
services for refugee and host populations [22], making
the region well-placed to incorporate refugees into
sleeping sickness surveillance activities. Nevertheless,
one year into the response, an incongruous situation
emerged in which sleeping sickness RDTs, a key sur-
veillance tool and indicator of access to sleeping sick-
ness care, had been removed from facilities serving
high concentrations of refugees who were believed to
be at risk for the disease. This exacerbated an already
existing gap in equitable access to elimination initia-
tives between host and refugee populations in West
Nile that persisted for at least 3 years. Through close
examination of the politics and experiences of refu-
gees and implementers, this study investigated issues
with these tandem processes of integration of tech-
nologies and people into government systems to ex-
plain this inequitable outcome and understand key
governance challenges sleeping sickness programmes
may face to achieve SDG equity goals among popula-
tions of forced migrants.
Methods
Elimination context in West Nile
Successive forced migrations over the South Sudan-
Ugandan border have been associated with successive
epidemics of gambiense-type sleeping sickness in both
countries since at least the 1970s [7–9, 23, 24]. The most
recent epidemic was associated with the Central and
East African wars of the 1990s. Uganda reported a peak
of 1123 cases in 1997 and South Sudan a peak of 3121
in 2002 [5]. Measures by government, humanitarian
agencies, research organisations and coordinating bodies
such as the Uganda Trypanosomiasis Control Council
(UTCC) and its secretariat, the Coordinating Office for
Control of Trypanosomiasis in Uganda (COCTU),
helped achieve a steady reduction of cases in both coun-
tries since the 1990s, despite continued large-scale con-
flict and post-conflict return migrations. In 2013, only
117 cases were reported from South Sudan and only 9
from Uganda [25].
The elimination of gambiense sleeping sickness was
declared feasible at a global level in 2011 [26], but, in
practical terms, this was not true for Uganda or South
Sudan until they entered partnerships with the Founda-
tion for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) to introduce
new diagnostics, including RDTs, to strengthen their
health systems and “accelerate” progress towards elimin-
ation [27]. The low case load in both places had deterred
humanitarian actors from maintaining their outreach-
based sleeping sickness programmes. The national pro-
grammes became reliant on a passive approach to case
detection, with screening services for the West Nile
Region’s 2.2 million people, for example, only available
at four facilities. While Uganda was deemed capable of
maintaining disease control at this prevalence without
external support, this approach to case detection was
not thought adequate to achieve elimination [14].
Under the FIND-supported and multi-donor-funded
Intensified Sleeping Sickness Elimination Programme
(ISSEP), the Ugandan Ministry of Health has distributed
sleeping sickness RDTs to over 200 frontline facilities
and hospitals since mid-2013 (Fig. 1 and Additional file 1)
[27].1 These covered the limits of G fuscipes-type tsetse
habitat which supports gambiense-type sleeping sickness
in the country. A similar programme was initiated in
areas of South Sudan abutting Uganda in 2015, although
insecurity since 2016 means many activities have been
suspended. Distribution of RDTs was accompanied by a
one-day workshop for staff in each facility to train them
in how to recognise symptoms of the disease and use
the RDT on syndromic suspects they came across in
their routine work. With HAT prevalence at such a low
level in this setting, fewer than 1 of every 100 patients
who test positive with the RDT is expected to be a true
case [28]. Twelve referral facilities were thus also
equipped with fluorescent LED microscopes and three
with LAMP machines to confirm patients screened with
RDTs. Under this strategy, 19 cases had been identified
as of September 2017, including three among South
Sudanese refugees and migrants (two in 2017).
Refugee health policy context in Uganda
By global standards, Uganda has an inclusive refugee policy
which recognises refugees’ right to health, education, work
and move freely. International health responses for refugees
have been actively integrated into local government-
managed systems since 2000 [19]. Exclusionary practices in
other sectors, however, are believed to have harmful effects
on refugee health and well-being [29].
Refugee studies scholars routinely criticise the govern-
ment- and the United Nations Refugee Agency
(UNHCR)-led practice of driving most refugees into set-
tlements [29–32], a type of open camp setting managed
by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and humani-
tarian agencies in sparsely populated rural areas loaned
from local communities. Importantly, settlements segre-
gate refugees from the local population by allocating
refugees land that is neither adequate for nutritional
self-sufficiency nor close enough to urban centres to
enable other forms of livelihood and access to cash [30].
Despite sometimes violent conflicts with the host com-
munity over resource use [31, 32], neither police nor
development actors tend to engage with refugees, viewing
settlements as temporary phenomena [29, 32]. Settlements
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can thus ultimately make refugees vulnerable both socially
and economically, and reinforce difference [30].
The settlement system can also sometimes work against
refugee integration into the health system. As humanitar-
ian resources need to be seen as benefiting both host and
refugee communities, health funding raised by UNHCR is
targeted to existing government primary healthcare struc-
tures near refugee settlements, either through direct con-
tributions to the OPM which disburses it to districts
which manage the facilities, or to non-governmental orga-
nisations (NGOs) to expand services at them. Refugees
self-settling outside of official settlements benefit from no
specific humanitarian health interventions. Very few add-
itional resources are directed to secondary and tertiary fa-
cilities which are also inaccessible when people in
settlements cannot pay for taxis as ambulances are scarce.
Vertically-organised government programmes which re-
quire the coordination of resources beyond primary care
are implicitly expected to absorb refugee needs. Recent
failures among these programmes have included high pro-
file epidemics of malaria [33, 34], hepatitis B [35] and mal-
nutrition [33] whereas an outbreak of measles was largely
avoided because of pre-emptive humanitarian-led vaccin-
ation [33]. While in popular media refugees have long
taken the blame for such outbreaks in Uganda [34–36],
infectious disease threats from host communities to refu-
gees are seldom recognised politically [34]. Integration of
healthcare services is historically perceived as having im-
proved healthcare for host nationals in Uganda but wors-
ened it for refugees [20]. Today, refugees living both
inside and outside settlements continue to characterise ac-
cess to health services as inadequate [30].
Research approach
To understand if displaced populations are being left be-
hind in development programmes, refugee studies
Fig. 1 Map of West Nile region in north-west Uganda showing locations of health facilities with sleeping sickness diagnostic capacity. Legend:
Facilities using sleeping sickness RDTs are represented as red circles, facilities where RDTs have been withdrawn are shown in blue, facilities with
HAT LED microscopy capacity in green and those with LAMP capacity in yellow. District names within West Nile are shown in block capitals. See
[54] for original, interactive online map to access more information about timing related to RDT introduction, withdrawal (and in some places,
re-introduction) in individual facilities. In August 2014, the only facilities with RDT-based surveillance capability were Adjumani Hospital and the
level 4 health centre in Mungulla
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scholars suggest examining whether displaced and host-
ing area populations are equally able to access the same
resources, including whether similar per capita amounts
are provided for each population, adjusted for disease
prevalence [20]. In the context of sleeping sickness elim-
ination, we considered a marker of ‘access’ to be
whether RDTs were used at similar rates in refugee and
host populations, given that screening with RDTs is a
precursor to all further case detection and treatment ac-
tion by a programme.
As the ISSEP had not set-out to prospectively monitor
access equity, we used available facility-based passive
screening data from the programme (calculating the
number of RDTs used per facility and per endemic dis-
trict over time) and compared this to UNHCR data on
the sizes of refugee populations hosted across districts to
discern, in broad terms, possible disparities in surveil-
lance access for refugees. We also attempted to explore
refugees’ own perceptions of their access to sleeping
sickness surveillance, including how this contributes to
their social integration and therefore good health [20].
To explain the disparities that we identified, we
employed a variety of qualitative methods to understand
evolving operational and governance challenges. We
paid particular attention to the processes through which
policies, norms, power and language influence decision-
making within the ISSEP (across West Nile from
December 2013 to September 2016) and within humani-
tarian health responses (predominantly in Adjumani
District, from July 2015, Table 1).
Research activities were conducted alongside and drew
on material generated for smaller research studies
commissioned by the ISSEP for programme improve-
ment and written up in technical reports [37–39]. Infor-
mation on historical and contemporary approaches to
sleeping sickness service governance and integration in
West Nile came from: ethnographic observations and
conversations with people participating in high level
sleeping sickness coordination meetings, observation of
ISSEP training activities and focus group discussions
(FGDs) with health workers undergoing the training and
interviews with ISSEP field supervisors. Key topics inves-
tigated and analysed were: expectations about how RDTs
should be deployed and used by workers within the gen-
eral health system, decision-making surrounding emer-
ging challenges, and plans to control sleeping sickness in
migrant and/or refugee populations. FGDs with health
workers (labelled in the analysis as ‘District training
FGD’ with ‘District’ referring to where they occurred) as
well as all interviews and meetings were conducted in
English. FGDs were recorded and transcribed, as were
ethnographic interactions when possible, otherwise field
notes with verbatim quotations were made on the spot
and expanded on later in the day.
Information on the integrated organisation of care for
refugees came from: interviews conducted with represen-
tatives of government and non-governmental authorities
as well as staff at health facilities serving refugees, which
were recorded and transcribed. Challenges organising and
delivering care were explored, including how humanitar-
ians accounted for vertical programming needs, particu-
larly the need for sleeping sickness control.
We collected information from refugees on their ex-
perience of both processes of integration using FGDs,
covering the following topics: typical health problems
refugees face, experiences of healthcare in Uganda and
elsewhere, knowledge and experience of sleeping sick-
ness, awareness of sleeping sickness RDT availability and
suggestions for how to improve services for refugees.
FGDs were conducted in local languages by research as-
sistants recruited from refugee settlements and trained
using methods described in [40]. Participants were re-
cruited through natural groupings such as women’s or
men’s groups and excluded anyone who worked at a
health facility. Material from each FGD was discussed by
the research team during immediate de-briefings as well
Table 1 Summary of research methods used according to
integration process studied
Research
methods used
Integration of sleeping
sickness case detection
into general health
services
Integration of refugee
responses into general
health services
Ethnographic
observations
during
meetings
2013–2016: Observations
of discussions about ISSEP
at 6 high level national
and international meetings
and conversations with
discussants;
2013: Observation of 4
ISSEP training days and
conversations with trainers
Interviews
with key
informants
2013–2015: Repeated
interviews with 8 field
supervisors in all districts
2015: Interviews with
representatives of 4
government and
non-governmental
authorities coordinating
refugee health responses
and clinical staff at 4
health facilities serving
refugees
Focus group
discussions
(FGDs)
2013: 4 FGDs held with
24 health workers (mixed
genders) undergoing ISSEP
training in Arua, Yumbe
and Moyo Districts;
2015: 6 FGDs held with 47
refugees in Adjumani District
settlements (3 Dinka groups,
3 Madi, mixed genders, ≥18
years old)
2015: 6 FGDs with
refugees (see last
column)
Review of
programme
data
Review of RDT monitoring
data shared by ISSEP
Review of population
data shared by UNHCR
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as after full translated transcripts were produced to clar-
ify details and check translated phrasing.
We selected refugee participants by targeting settle-
ments we believed had the highest chance of containing
people exposed to sleeping sickness (see Additional file 1
for further detail). As of July 2015, Nimule, which has
hosted indigenous ethnic Madi and internally displaced
Dinka populations over the last decade, appeared to be
the sleeping sickness-endemic area within South Sudan
subject to the most forced migration. FGDs were thus
conducted in the following settlements which contained
people who lived in or migrated through Nimule, all of
which were located in Adjumani District: Maaji 1 (labelled
in the analysis as Madi FGD A), Maaji 2 (Madi B and C),
Ayilo 1 (Dinka A and B) and Nyumanzi (Dinka C).2,3
Transcripts and notes from interviews, FGDs and ob-
servations from both research strands were analysed the-
matically using NVivo software and combined in the
final analysis to identify the limitations of each integra-
tion strategy and how they interacted to unintentionally
limit refugees’ access to sleeping sickness surveillance.
Some excerpts from FGD and interview transcripts pre-
sented below have been edited for clarity, while attempt-
ing to preserve the tone and meaning of the original
translation. All contributions have been anonymized.
Results
A gap in surveillance equity
In 2014, a year into the programme, Adjumani District,
which hosted the largest refugee population (87% of ref-
ugees in the region), had used the least amount of RDTs
and had the lowest rate of RDT use (1.2 per facility per
month on average in Adjumani District versus 3.9 in the
region, Table 2), suggesting inequitable access to surveil-
lance for the majority of refugees living in West Nile.
This inequity was exacerbated when, at the end of that
year, managers decided to withdraw RDTs from facilities
in three districts: Amuru, Adjumani and southern Arua,
the latter two the only places hosting refugees. In Adju-
mani, whereas RDTs had initially been deployed in 36 fa-
cilities, RDTs remained available in just two hospitals
(Mungulla Health Centre 4 and Adjumani District
Hospital, Fig. 1 and Table 2). One was located near a
refugee settlement but most refugees lived more than an
hour’s drive away from either facility.
In recognition of the need to reach refugees better as
the crisis grew, the ISSEP began to re-introduce RDTs
into some Adjumani facilities in 2016 and conduct active
screening in some settlements. This 2013–16 period
however, represents a likely example of inequitable ac-
cess for refugees to sleeping sickness surveillance and
control in West Nile, the effects of which we describe
from the perspective of settlement populations next.
Refugee perspectives on surveillance access
When we spoke with refugees in Adjumani settlements
in 2015, the limitations of access were clearly felt. Only
one Maaji settlement resident mentioned knowing that
sleeping sickness tests were available in Adjumani town.
Otherwise, people in all group discussions stated they
did not know how they could be tested, despite clear
concern about their risk of disease.
Participants knew about sleeping sickness transmission
as well as the major signs and symptoms from past ex-
periences with the disease. Madi participants were par-
ticularly concerned about their risk of sleeping sickness
from the environment. As Maaji residents put it, “there
are too many flies, as this place was only for animals”
(participant 3, Madi FGD C), referring to the idea that
their settlements bordered the Zoka game reserve which
had been abandoned by local people during the Ugandan
war with the Lord’s Resistance Army. Until UNHCR de-
veloped the land for South Sudanese refugees in 2014,
residents said “this place was just bush” (participant 4,
Madi FGD A) and not fit for human habitation. This
worried people because bushy areas they had lived in
during previous displacements had caused them to get
sleeping sickness:
“the disease affected my son during the first war era
at border areas […he had] bad dreams and he was
always isolated, not playing with friends […] As a
babysitter, he would go […] with the parent of the
child to the garden which is deep in the bush, so he
got it from there” (participant 1, Madi FGD A)
While Dinka participants in Nyumanzi and Ayilo settle-
ments said they did not get bitten by tsetse in their
current settlements, fear or dislike of bushy areas was a
Table 2 Refugee population compared to rate of facility RDT
use by district, Aug 2013-Jun 2014
District Refugee
population
(Jun 2014)a
# RDTs used
per facility-
month
(Aug 2013 –
Jun 2014)
# Facilities
using RDTs
# Facility-
months
RDTs
available
# RDTs
used
Koboko – 9.5 14 135 1279
Maracha – 5.3 14 140 742
Yumbe – 5.4 24 165 883
Arua 11,098 3.4 57 465 1563
Moyo – 2.8 40 218 608
Amuru – 2.5 27 135 337
Adjumani 76,043 1.2 36 176 217
a Population data refers to South Sudanese refugees who came to Uganda
after 15 Dec 2013 and had registered with UNHCR by 17 Jun 2014 [55]. No
settlements hosting South Sudanese refugees existed outside of Adjumani and
Arua Districts at this time. RDT data was shared by the programme and
analysed in [38]
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key reason that Dinka people in Nyumanzi protested be-
ing moved to a new settlement in Yumbe in 2016 [41].
Residents in all settlements worried there could be
people living among them or in neighbouring host com-
munities who were spreading sleeping sickness. Partici-
pants therefore requested access to screening services
because people believed cases “are there but we do not
know them” (participant 2, Dinka FGD B) and “patients
with the disease are not allowed to mix with other
people in the settlement” (participant 4, Madi FGD A).
Residents also wanted access to ensure that they them-
selves weren’t infected, suggesting health agencies
“should come here in the field with tools to test the en-
tire community so that everyone knows his or her sta-
tus” (participant 7, Madi FGD A). Participants advocated
services be extended to refugee areas in particular, argu-
ing that humanitarian agencies had consistently empha-
sised in the past that sleeping sickness was of special
concern to displaced populations: “They [humanitarian
agencies] went to check refugees first […] because we,
the refugees, are affected by most diseases” (participant
5, Madi FGD C).
Sharing statements such as: “Screening facilities for
sleeping sickness are not here in Uganda but in South
Sudan they are common in places like Yei, Maridi, Yambio
and Nimule side” (participant 7, Dinka FGD A), refugees
therefore unanimously stated that their access to sleeping
sickness screening was better in South Sudan, before dis-
placement, than in Uganda. Moreover, in a situation of
displacement where “life […] is hard […and] different
things can kill you at any time” (participant 4, Madi FGD
B), not having control over risk from such a disease ap-
peared to add to refugees’ sense of social exclusion.
Understanding the unintended equity gap
ISSEP outlook towards migration
This equity gap was unintended. From its origins, cross-
border migration was perceived as a challenge Uganda’s
ISSEP would need to address and this perception in-
creased in urgency as the conflict in South Sudan con-
tinued to grow [42]. At RDT training workshops in 2013
before the refugee influx, for example, coordinators
asked health providers to “look out” for imported cases
from among people migrating for work, healthcare or to
visit family, saying, “Cases can spill over […] if our
neighbours are not doing their work […]. Be on the
look-out for people from [South] Sudan, asking yourself,
‘Are they safe? Are they clean?’” Health workers believed
that having RDTs under the ISSEP would assist them to
help migrants with sleeping sickness; otherwise, as one
health worker argued, “when they come like this, we
miss them and we miss the opportunity to diagnose
sleeping sickness” (participant 1, Arua training FGD).
Specific concerns about refugee movements surfaced
six months later, by which time the conflict in South
Sudan had prompted more than 70,000 people to cross
the border to refugee settlements in West Nile. At an
annual review meeting in May 2014, a member of the
government’s UTCC questioned ISSEP coordinators dir-
ectly, saying: “We have strong hope that Uganda will be
able to eliminate but you dampen our spirits when you
talk about South Sudan.” A member of COCTU particu-
larly highlighted the risks of refugees living in Uganda’s
“hinterland”, unused rural areas which could be expected
to have tsetse flies but poor health surveillance, saying:
“South Sudan needs to be taken seriously. Refugees who
come into the north should not be allowed to go to the
hinterlands until they are screened. […] Those found
positive should not be allowed to come in.”
Such demonstrable concern for disease transmission
from refugees, however, appeared incongruent with the
way RDTs as surveillance resources were used within the
ISSEP, as already described. Below, we argue that this
mismatch of intention and response in practice can be
explained by four key governance challenges that made
it difficult for the programme to recognise and correct
inequities affecting refugees: (a) donor pressure to re-
duce the ISSEP’s scope in the absence of clear inter-
national elimination guidelines on surveillance quality;
(b) the local legacy of programme relations with refugee-
hosting districts which strained supervision arrange-
ments that should ensure surveillance quality; (c) diffi-
culties that government health workers faced to produce
good quality surveillance in a crisis; and (d) reluctant en-
gagement between the ISSEP and humanitarian
structures.
Pressure to reduce programme scope
For national programme coordinators, a key rationale for
integrating the new diagnostic technologies in general
health services was to increase health staff participation in
surveillance but this was inconsistent with donor needs to
contain costs. As intervention staff described in ISSEP
training lectures in 2013, many technically capable facilities
did not offer the services they potentially could because
they had never been supported to use available but cumber-
some diagnostic tools. Since RDTs were easy enough to use
by any health worker, trainers sought to motivate facility
staff to break from “business as usual” and encourage
“everyone” to be involved. Technological inclusiveness
came at a financial cost, however. In ISSEP coordination
meetings programme managers were thus requested by
FIND to discuss strategies to best target resources and
supervision workload across West Nile [43]. Primarily this
involved progressively “dropping” facilities from the
programme where deploying surveillance resources was
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harder to justify, and which FIND estimated to cost around
USD 300 each to support in the first year [44].
Additionally, RDTs are such a new technology that
international elimination strategy offers unclear guidance
on how long they should be deployed, and at what inten-
sity they should be used under an integrated primary
health care approach without detecting cases, before an
area can be considered disease free [28].4 Many areas in
West Nile had not reported a single case in the five years
prior to the ISSEP, a key metric in global sleeping sickness
elimination monitoring [26]. Given that so little systematic
mobile team-based screening had been done recently,
however, all facilities in areas considered at risk were pur-
posely included in the programme. Coordinators reasoned
that if no cases continued to be found after introducing
RDTs, these areas could be assumed to have eliminated
sleeping sickness and the programme could reduce sur-
veillance to a restricted number of ‘sentinel’ sites. Staff at
the ‘dropped’ facilities would continue to refer possible
cases to sentinel sites based on syndromic suspicion. If
these sites then identified cases, this would alert author-
ities to continued transmission in the area which could
trigger reactive interventions. The programme chose their
one year anniversary, August 2014, to withdraw these re-
sources, focussing on facilities at the southern and eastern
edges of the endemic zone. As the last place to receive
RDTs, however, they had only been in use in Adjumani
District for six months. Most facilities serving refugee set-
tlements had only ever used less than 10 RDTs before they
were dropped from the programme.
In withdrawing RDTs from Adjumani District, ISSEP
decision-makers do not appear to have considered how
the programme’s interactions with refugees may have af-
fected the quality of surveillance upon which these deci-
sions were made. Rather, RDTs were withdrawn mainly
because they were being used at health facilities at low
levels. While low case numbers with high RDT use would
suggest the low disease endemicity here expected at the
ISSEP design stage, low case numbers with low RDT use
suggested to some ISSEP managers a lack of commitment
by facilities to effectively implement the intervention
which wouldn’t be justifiable to FIND’s donors. As one
ISSEP coordinator reasoned in an interview, there was “no
point in spending resources on supervision if RDTs were
not being used”. Other coordinators who worried surveil-
lance hadn’t been given enough of a chance to find cases
here felt their hands were tied by donor expectations, cit-
ing long experience of having to implement donor-funded
projects with “strings attached” and austere exit strategies.
Local supervision legacies
To build sustainable supervision structures, the ISSEP re-
cruited supervisors from a pool of people already
employed by districts who would have many additional
responsibilities besides sleeping sickness programming.
People who were most motivated in previous sleeping
sickness programmes were particularly favoured to
supervise integration locally. As described in a 2013 inter-
view, ISSEP coordinators believed being selective within
this pool was important because successful technological
integration depended on supervisors engaging facility staff
“to win their hearts”. This also, however, carried a parallel
assumption that programme failure could “only be due to
the attitude of the health workers”.
In places without a legacy of successful relationships
with vertical sleeping sickness projects, such as Adjumani,
therefore, the ISSEP coordinators felt they were at a disad-
vantage. For example, they felt that the following charac-
terisation by an international expert who managed a
sleeping sickness programme in 2001–2 was still valid in
2015: “Moyo was always the star focus but disease reduced
early on here. Adjumani was always a disaster because we
could never interest people in the lab to get involved”.
Similarly, when discussing staff problems in another dis-
trict of West Nile, an ISSEP coordinator in 2014 acknowl-
edged that in the ISSEP design stage, they thought, “if
there was a way of leaving them out, we would have.
People have been very difficult there, but they’d be an is-
land” in a programme aiming for regional elimination.
Other unattractive characteristics of Adjumani District,
such as its extreme heat and poor accommodation options
for coordination staff, meant that it was usually treated as
an outpost of neighbouring Moyo district. Partly this
reflected Adjumani’s relatively new district status. It had
been carved out of greater Moyo district in 2006 and
COCTU struggled to interest the new authorities in tryp-
anosomiasis control. Thus, despite having a similar num-
ber of participating facilities as other districts (Table 2),
for the first half of the programme Adjumani never had
its own supervisor, borrowing supervision resources in-
stead from Moyo. This effectively halved the district’s “in-
person supervision” time stressed during ISSEP training
events as so important for encouraging RDT use and iden-
tifying implementation problems which could affect sur-
veillance data quality. What would become Uganda’s
biggest refugee hosting district in the region was therefore
never expected to integrate sleeping sickness detection
technologies well but was also arguably never supported
sufficiently to do so.
Difficulties using RDTs in a crisis
Almost immediately there appeared to be implementa-
tion challenges in Adjumani facilities serving refugee
populations affecting both intra-facility dynamics among
staff and dynamics between providers and patients. With
Nyumanzi Health Centre staff increasing from 2 people
before the South Sudan conflict to more than 30 by
2015, for example, entirely new management structures
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were introduced. Given that staff who had originally
been trained to use RDTs by the ISSEP typically occu-
pied the lowest cadres employed in the new structures,
this sometimes made sharing knowledge and norms
about RDTs introduced by the ISSEP to other staff
awkward.
Patient-provider communication necessary to prompt
decisions to use sleeping sickness RDTs was also de-
scribed as very difficult by both staff and refugees.
Translators, for example, were scarce at the hospitals
which would become sentinel surveillance sites. As de-
scribed by a senior medical staff member at Adjumani
District Hospital: “they are very few so they cannot be
everywhere, like in the OPD [outpatient department] we
do not have”. But even at lower-level facilities where
translation assistance was more available, Dinka people
feared they were often misunderstood with the conse-
quence that, “you may not be treated, or if you get an
improper translation you get the wrong medicine” (par-
ticipant 2, Dinka FGD C). Even Madi-speaking refugees
living in a Madi-speaking area of Uganda complained of
similar communication problems at facilities staffed by
non-Madi Ugandans recruited for the humanitarian
surge response, as in the following description:
“the translator laughed at me and told me I should
return with my husband. So I questioned him, ‘why
should I go with my husband and what was the
problem?’ He just told me I should understand what
he is telling me. The second time I went […] When I
started explaining to the doctor my problem, the
translator was explaining a different thing that made
me to be given Panadol [paracetamol] only. But after
explaining without being translated, other drugs like
amoxicillin, tests, and so many others were added”
(participant 5, Madi FGD A).
Difficulty translating undoubtedly contributed to the
mismatch between what type of care refugees said they
expected versus what they received. Almost uniformly,
however, health and programme staff interpreted patient
expressions of dissatisfaction as cultural, as well. For ex-
ample, refugees’ preference for medicine delivered as an
injection rather than oral tablets was perceived to be ig-
norant. A staff member from Mungulla Health Centre
told us: “if you give them tablets, believe me, by evening
they are going to be back”. Negative characterisations of
people from South Sudan as rude, impatient, ignorant
and stubborn peppered the descriptions of refugees by
staff. Health providers often seemed overwhelmed by
refugee needs and ill-equipped to interpret refugee care-
seeking as anything other than unruly, saying, for ex-
ample: “you can never please them [refugees], however
much you may try, you fail” (staff member at Adjumani
hospital). Similarly, South Sudanese people said health
staff see refugees as “enemies” (Madi FGD A) and “talk
to people in a bad way, they quarrel” (participant 1,
Dinka FGD B).
Such confrontations led many refugees to question
whether their right to healthcare was less legitimate than
the surrounding host population’s, going so far as to
wonder if health staff ’s tendency not to use diagnostic
tests in healthcare interactions was deliberate. One par-
ticipant complained, for example, that “there is a micro-
scope for doing the work but it’s just there and they are
not using it. Maybe laboratory equipment for testing all
the sicknesses is there but they are intentionally not
using them” (participant 1, Madi FGD A). Moreover,
such tensions between providers and patients and
among staff at facilities likely made it very difficult to
have the types of conversations necessary to prompt use
of RDTs and contribute data for strategic decision-
making by the surveillance programme.
Reluctance to engage humanitarian structures
Sleeping sickness experts especially outside of Uganda
believed that a lack of political will among humanitarian
responders to participate in elimination might have been
to blame for the apparent absence of activities for refu-
gees. As stated by a WHO representative at an inter-
national meeting in 2016:
In a refugee situation the priority is not sleeping
sickness; [mal]nutrition, cholera is there, it is difficult
to convince the actors to put attention here. We are
the ones who know we are risking something, that
something needs to be done. So we are trying to move
the NGOs and UNHCR to at least put this issue on
the table.
Indeed, the facility-level communication issues outlined
above reflect the chaotic circumstances, political sensi-
tivities and rationing inherent to operating health ser-
vices in a crisis context.
However, it’s unlikely that humanitarian health
workers and coordinators were opposed to participating
in a sleeping sickness response. As described by staff
from Ayilo Health Centre who told us, “we haven’t yet
got microscopes, our laboratory is not fully ready but we
have rapid tests”, many humanitarians viewed their ac-
cess to RDTs for other diseases as a useful short-cut to
having full lab infrastructure. Likewise, refugee groups
we spoke with also unanimously wanted access to a
greater variety of all sorts of blood tests. Rather, such
RDTs for sleeping sickness were often not made avail-
able to responders through the integrated structures
they were supposed to be working in.
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How humanitarian actors typically engage vertical pro-
grammes in Uganda was described to us by a UNHCR
health advisor this way: “when it comes to vertical pro-
grammes like tuberculosis, UNHCR doesn’t buy the drugs,
the district does and the quality assurance. UNHCR pro-
grammes just provide the service and dispense.” With
sleeping sickness RDTs no longer part of the standard tests
available within government systems in Adjumani and
southern Arua, however, sleeping sickness did not feature
in discussions between humanitarian actors and other dis-
trict government authorities in charge of general refugee
health integration. Consequently, most humanitarian prac-
titioners we spoke to associated sleeping sickness only with
the previous refugee crisis in Uganda and were unaware of
any elimination efforts. Moreover, outside of sentinel sur-
veillance facilities, no UNHCR, NGO manager or facility
staff we spoke with in 2015 were aware that they had re-
sponsibilities to refer syndromic suspects to sentinel detec-
tion sites, reflecting a lack of communication between the
ISSEP and humanitarian actors at a local and regional level.
ISSEP coordinators, themselves, admitted they were
reluctant to engage in communication with responders.
Partly this reluctance related to their belief that any ac-
tivities unplanned in the ISSEP design, such as the com-
prehensive screening of refugees desired by COCTU
authorities, were deemed to require further funding by
international donors. As one coordinator argued in
2014, “1 case of sleeping sickness is worth 600 cases of
malaria in terms of management” and “targeting all of
them [settlements] requires a lot of resources, it takes
time to raise these”. More fundamentally, however, for
all district supervisors and national coordinators inter-
viewed between 2014 and 2016, refugees were perceived
not to be the responsibility of the national sleeping sick-
ness programme, leaving a clear gap in sleeping sickness
elimination governance. According to a former inter-
national sleeping sickness programme manager, this is
an attitude that has evidently not changed since the last
humanitarian crisis in early 2000, despite national initia-
tives to improve cross-sectoral coordination of trypano-
somiasis activities through the UTCC and COCTU [14].
Discussion
This study has demonstrated an important limitation to
Uganda’s integrated refugee policy by observing the na-
tional sleeping sickness programme’s response to an influx
of South Sudanese refugees from 2013 to 2016. We ob-
served several entrenched norms and practices that worked
against integration of refugees into the national sleeping
sickness medical surveillance system, despite the availability
of a promising technological innovation, an RDT, that could
be deployed in the government-controlled spaces where
refugees were being provided care.
Before the refugee influx, Adjumani District was as-
sumed to have disease prevalence so low that there
would be little need for surveillance. These assumptions
were not contradicted by RDT-based monitoring data
produced during the first six months of the programme,
so the programme reduced surveillance intensity by re-
moving RDTs from most facilities in the district. This
had harmful, if unintended, consequences for surveil-
lance equity in West Nile, as Adjumani was the place
where most refugees were sent and sleeping sickness ex-
perts both within and outside the country believe refu-
gees are at particular risk of disease.
This story has important implications for global sleeping
sickness programmes seeking to uphold commitments to
addressing disease in vulnerable populations as well as the
legitimacy of their claims about elimination. Finding no
cases from areas or populations that have been largely ex-
cluded from surveillance appears as a programmatic suc-
cess but it may alternatively be explained as a failure of
implementation. Ethnographic study of other global health
programmes in Uganda [45] and elsewhere [46] suggest
important incentives for coordinators not to “look beneath
the surface” of successful outcomes data “to see how
stated practice relate[s] to actual behaviour” because of
the need to prove normative progress towards global goals
or to justify subsequent rounds of funding [45]. Indeed,
the need to prove that elimination was happening is a
likely explanation for so many refugees’ social exclusion
from surveillance in West Nile.
Poor quality implementation was anticipated here be-
cause of historical expectations ISSEP coordinators had
about the quality of their relationships to Adjumani and
some other districts. Additionally, district and national
supervisors felt reluctant to engage with refugee-specific
issues such as communicating with government health
staff recruited for the humanitarian surge response to fa-
miliarise them with RDTs, their expected role in the
elimination programme, or address their diagnosis-
related communication challenges with patients. Coordi-
nators also, however, wanted to demonstrate to donors
that they were spending resources efficiently. So, in prac-
tice, staff not using RDTs at sufficient levels to justify
the cost of monitoring was at least as important a reason
for withdrawing RDTs from facilities as was coordinators’
perception of low sleeping sickness prevalence in the
district. The absence of international guidance on the
quality of surveillance required to produce evidence of
elimination before restricting resources in a sentinel sur-
veillance strategy also presumably contributed.
Fully integrating refugees into vertical health pro-
grammes coordinated at the national level seems to be a
common problem in Uganda. This may not have affected
sleeping sickness control until recently, however, be-
cause medical humanitarian agencies have historically
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been such central actors involved in sleeping sickness in-
terventions in this region [14, 24]. Concerned with both
the high mortality of this disease during epidemics and
the affected populations who were displaced by conflict,
there was substantial overlap in these agencies’ refugee
health and sleeping sickness mandates and their re-
sponses typically occurred parallel to government struc-
tures. As disease has receded, however, humanitarians
have disengaged with sleeping sickness control globally
and endemic country governments keen to ‘accelerate’
progress towards elimination are now firmly in the driv-
ing seat in elimination programmes. It is perhaps not
surprising then, that the ISSEP, which channels inter-
national funds through the Ministry of Health, has had
difficulty integrating refugees. Refugees have not been
the Ministry’s responsibility by long-standing tradition in
sleeping sickness [14].
Forced displacement, however, is a growing problem
globally. Notably, all 36 countries at risk of sleeping sick-
ness host forcibly displaced populations including refu-
gees, internally displaced persons or recently returned
displaced people, with nearly half (17 or 47.2%) support-
ing large displaced populations of at least 50,000 people,
many of whom could be living in areas which support
transmission (Additional file 2). New norms, incentives
or structures thus urgently need to be established to en-
sure the needs of displaced people are not left behind by
government sleeping sickness programmes in their en-
thusiasm to demonstrate elimination progress. The Glo-
bal Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has
successfully encouraged integration in some national
malaria elimination programmes by prompting countries
to include additional provisions for refugees in their
applications [4]. The SDGs commit countries to moni-
toring progress towards all targets according to charac-
teristics of vulnerable populations, including migratory
status [47]. Elimination programmes can also be evalu-
ated on their inclusiveness towards forced migrant pop-
ulations such as whether health outcomes for both host
and migrant populations are improved, something which
was beyond the scope of our investigations [20].
This study also highlighted important limitations of
RDTs to produce quality and relevant data for elimin-
ation. Despite the technology’s appealing simplicity,
RDTs are always controlled by human decision-making
and behaviour. This is especially important for sleeping
sickness programmes like the ISSEP which have aban-
doned more systematic approaches to case detection,
and rely instead on social interactions between patients
and providers to identify syndromic suspects for testing.
Refugees in West Nile had to overcome substantial com-
munication challenges, sometimes including discrimin-
ation, to leave a health consultation feeling satisfied. In
other settings in Africa, people who have difficulty
communicating their health problems to staff because of
differences in literacy, class or ethnicity typically come
away with fewer medicines [48]. Crossing an inter-
national border also sharply affects power relations even
when refugees and the host population belong to the
same ethnic group [49]. We should assume that it is
more difficult for a national health worker to suspect
that a refugee than a citizen patient is affected by sleep-
ing sickness through conversations about symptoms and
alternative diagnoses, given how exasperated with ser-
vice delivery both parties felt. While health providers
may not like refugees standing over them, demanding to
know what tests and medicines they are prescribing, the
sleeping sickness literature consistently concludes that
patients need to be persistent seekers of healthcare in
order to receive a correct diagnosis [17, 50]. Indeed,
patient-led detection is a key reason why internally dis-
placed people have been detected so successfully else-
where [17]. Persistence in healthcare should thus not be
dismissed as bad behaviour in the refugee context.
Recommendations
Despite their structural and historical basis, the problems
highlighted above can be overcome in West Nile and
avoided elsewhere. Donor conditionality that incentivises
programmes to anticipate refugee needs and disaggregate
reporting on vulnerable groups could improve pro-
grammes’ relationships with facilities that serve refugees.
National trypanosomiasis coordinating bodies (such as
COCTU in Uganda) can also promote the integration of
migrant populations in national NTD programme policies,
budgets and plans, per states’ commitments to the SDGs.
How best to overcome systemic integration issues such as
communication between government and humanitarian
structures should be considered, to ensure that diagnostics
are available and used in government and private facilities
serving refugees who are at risk of disease. These spaces are
key for the successful implementation of both elimination
programmes and refugee integration policies. At RDT
trainings for health staff, persistence in health-seeking as
positive patient behaviour in sleeping sickness could be dis-
cussed and translators and community liaisons could also
be invited to increase staff and patients’ awareness of avail-
able sleeping sickness diagnostics. International guidance
on how long and at what intensity surveillance diagnostics
should be kept in place is an outstanding issue [26]. In the
interim, supervisors and coordinators should be encour-
aged to investigate operational reasons for very low use of
RDTs in individual facilities.
Conclusions
Monitoring equity between forcibly-displaced and host
populations will be a key challenge for disease elimin-
ation programmes in the SDG era. Despite a promising
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policy context for the integration of South Sudanese ref-
ugees into national medical surveillance systems for
sleeping sickness elimination in Uganda, we observed
key governance and operational challenges that limited
refugees’ equitable inclusion. These ranged from per-
ceived donor pressure to contain costs, to local and
inter-sectoral coordination issues, to cross-cultural com-
munication challenges with using RDTs. Unclear inter-
national guidance on how to use RDTs as a new
technology in an elimination context also contributed.
Though they have a historical basis, these challenges can
be overcome. We support recent calls for a more robust,
internationally-supported but government-led response
that specifically meets the needs of refugees living in
Uganda and uses all available tools [42]. Elimination pro-
grammes which marginalise forced migrants risk unwit-
tingly contributing to disease spread [1, 46] and
reinforce social inequities, so new norms need to be
established at local, national and international levels.
Endnotes
1Apart from this passive approach to case detection,
western districts of the West Nile region have benefitted
from tsetse control activities using insecticide-treated
targets established under a 2011 pilot programme.
Under the multi-country Trypa-No! project, Adjumani is
expected to be included in 2017. Mobile team-based
screening was also used on a small scale in the pilot to
measure the project’s impact [27].
2Major refugee settlements in West Nile were established
in Adjumani and Arua Districts in 2014 and 2015 and in
Yumbe and Amuru Districts in 2016. As of 30 Sep 2016,
more than half of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda
(58%) were living in settlements in Adjumani District [51].
3Whereas pre-2016, most displacement to Uganda came
from non-endemic areas of South Sudan, the increase in
fighting in southern states since July 2016 means more ref-
ugees are now coming from disease-affected areas [52, 53]
and they are settling inside and outside of Adjumani.
4Based on experience with the CATT diagnostic test po-
sitioned in central facilities, recommended global strategy
for areas of high transmission intensity is to reduce sur-
veillance to a restricted number of ‘sentinel’ sites once no
cases have been reported from an area in the last five
years, during which time control measures such as
outreach-based screening should have been in place [26].
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Additional file 2: Forcibly-displaced persons living in sleeping sickness
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